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however, one could argue that the legislative body has already determined which public interests are worthy of protection and that interferences with those interests are presumptively unreasonable." Therefore,
the court's function is limited to the determination of a violation of the
statute, the constitutionality of the statute, and the selection of a remedy.43 Once an activity is codified as a nuisance and the literal terms of
the ordinance are violated, no other factors need be examined by the
court." Following the Fry decision, a manufacturer will be guilty of a
violation regardless of attempts to avoid the nuisance, if in the end the
nuisance still occurs.
Although the Minnesota courts will not consider a defendant's attempts to avoid the nuisance in determining whether the criminal nuisance statute has been violated, presumably reasonable attempts to
avoid the nuisance would have an effect on the court's determination of
appropriate punishment. Likewise, the defendant's exercise of due care
might bear on the remedy chosen by the court in a civil action for
nuisance.
Real Property-ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACT FOR DEED-Berman v.
247 N.W.2d 405 (1976).
Kieren, Minn. -,
In the law of real property, abandonment refers to the voluntary relinquishment of an interest in land.' Although a perfect legal title may not
802, 420 U.S. 1000 (1974), modified on othergrounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Note,
supra note 15, at 159; Comment, supra note 18, at 226.
42. See State v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 459-60, 219 N.W. 770, 771 (1928) (prerogative
of the legislature to determine that it was in the public interest to declare distribution of
scandalous material to be a nuisance; the determination by the legislature is presumptively valid, but not conclusive); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 130,
130 N.W. 545, 547 (1911) (legislature and city council presumed to have all the necessary
facts to make a rational decision on what constitutes a nuisance).
43. See, e.g., State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911)
(ordinance prohibiting dense smoke from the burning of soft coal upheld as constitutional;
fine imposed on defendant for violating the ordinance); City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36
Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886) (ordinance prohibiting emission of dense smoke from chimneys held void as unauthorized by the legislature).
246 N.W.2d 692, 695
- Minn ....
44. State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
(1976); H. Christiansen & Sons v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475, 483, 31 N.W.2d 270,
275 (1948); W. PRossER, supra note 12, § 87, at 576.

1. See Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 85, 105 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1960) (contract
for deed); Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 414, 159 N.W. 966,
967 (1916) (mineral lease); Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 129 Minn. 126, 131-32, 151
N.W. 907, 909 (1915) (easement). See generally 5 G. THoMpsON, Coamewrrmw ON THE
MODERN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2515 (1957 & Supp. 1976). The principles applicable to a
determination of abandonment of personal property are discussed at some length in Erickson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 232, 239-42, 26 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (1947).
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be lost by abandonment,2 an easement,3 or an oil and gas lease,' or a
purchaser's interest in a contract for deed' may be abandoned. A finding
of abandonment is dependent upon all the facts and circumstances
present in the case' because a critical element in the determination is
the intent of the holder of the interest to relinquish his rights in the
property.7 When the doctrine of abandonment is asserted against a purchaser under a contract for deed, the most crucial question is whether
the purchaser has continued to make payment of the purchase price., If
he has not, the court will determine if by other acts he has continued to
assert an active interest in the property. In particular, the court has
considered whether the purchaser has taken or retained possession of the
property,' sought a judicial declaration of his rights, 0 paid the real
estate taxes on the property," or neglected to keep in contact with the
vendor. 2 The doctrine of abandonment was involved in Berman v.
3
Kieren,1
where the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the evidence
was sufficient to support the conclusion that the purchasers under a
contract for deed had abandoned their equitable interest.
2. E.g., Krueger v. Market, 124 Minn. 393, 398, 145 N.W,2d 30, 32 (1914); see Smith v.
Glover, 50 Minn. 58, 74, 52 N.W. 912, 912 (1892).
3. E.g., Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 129 Minn. 126, 131-32, 151 N.W. 907, 909
(1915). See generally 2 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPEIM §§ 8.96-.98 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
4. E.g., Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 414, 159 N.W. 966,
967 (1916). See generally 2 AMEmcAN LAW OF PROPERT § 10.40 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
5. E.g., Berman v. Kieren, Minn. -,
247 N.W.2d 405, 408 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Ahlistrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn. 398, 401, 173 N.W.2d 330, 333 (1969);
Rognrud v. Zubert, 282 Minn. 430, 437, 165 N.W.2d 244, 250 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn. 398, 401, 173 N.W.2d 330, 333 (1969);
Rognrud v. Zubert, 282 Minn. 430, 437, 165 N.W.2d 244, 250 (1969).
The intention of the vendor to accept the purchaser's abandonment must also be considered. Cf. Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 133, 94 N.W.2d 273, 282
(1959) (MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1976) does not relieve purchaser "from the effect of an
abandonment which the vendor accepts").
8. Because the cases in Minnesota have all arisen only after the purchaser has defaulted
in payment, see, e.g., Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn. 398, 173 N.W.2d 330 (1969), it
would appear that the vendor would not have a plausible claim of abandonment if the
purchaser was current in payments.
9. See Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286 Minn. 257, 264, 175 N.W.2d 443, 448 (1970) (possession
retained through agent and caretaker); cf. Pratt v. Martig, 182 Minn. 250, 254, 234 N.W.
464, 466 (1931) (failure of tenant to cultivate farm lands did not constitute abandonment).
10. See, e.g., Buresh v. Allen, 296 Minn. 150, 153, 207 N.W.2d 279, 281 (1973) (per
curiam) (purchaser brought action for specific performance); Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286 Minn.
257, 175 N.W.2d 443 (1970) (purchaser sued for rescission).
11. See,'e.g., Berman v. Kieren, Minn. -,
-,
247 N.W.2d 405, 408 (1976).
12. See Rognrud v. Zubert, 282 Minn. 430, 437-38, 165 N.W.2d 244, 249-50 (1969) (gap
in communications between parties for four months could support finding of abandonment, but under facts of case, 11-week break was reasonable); Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp,
259 Minn. 82, 85-86, 105 N.W.2d 907,909-10 (1960) (under facts of case, four-month period
of delay in making payments could not support finding of abandonment); Boulevard Plaza
Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 134, 94 N.W.2d 273, 283 (1959) (purchaser's neglecting
performance for 18 months supported finding of abandonment).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/11
13.
- Minn. -, 247 N.W.2d 405 (1976).
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In Berman, the purchaser's interest had been assigned several times
before becoming vested in the defendants in August of 1970. The defendants discontinued making payments on the contract in early 1974.
The vendor than discovered that the house on the property was deserted
and had fallen into a state of disrepair. To protect his interest, the
vendor undertook to have the house repaired and secured a tenant for
the property. He than served defendants with notice of cancellation
pursuant to section 559.21 of the Minnesota Statutes." However, because his notice contained an incorrect legal description of the property,
it was ineffectual in terminating the defendants' interest. He then
brought an action to register title."' The referee who originally heard the
action agreed with the vendor that the purchaser's interest had been
extinguished by abandonment."6 This determination was supported by
evidence that the defendants had failed to pay the real estate taxes due
on the property for 1974, had vacated the property, had permitted a
house built on it to fall into disrepair, and had failed to tender payment
even when they were meeting with the vendor following the attempt to
cancel their interest. The district court's approval of the referee's decision was affirmed by the supreme court.
The supreme court did not undertake an exhaustive discussion of the
reasons for its decision, observing that the defendants had failed to
14. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1976) provides, in part:
When default is made in the conditions of any contract for the conveyance
of real estate or any interest therein, whereby the vendor has a right to terminate the same, he may do so by serving upon the purchaser .

.

. a notice

specifyirig the conditions in which default has been made, and stating that such
contract will terminate ...

unless ...

the purchaser shall comply with such

conditions ....
Such notice must be given notwithstanding any provisions in
the contract to the contrary ....
The purpose of the statute, as stated in Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166 Minn.
58, 62, 206 N.W. 948, 949 (1926), was to take "from the vendor in all cases the arbitrary
power to terminate the contract without notice." Accord, Enkema v. McIntyre, 136 Minn.
293, 298, 161 N.W. 587, 589 (1917) (statute "designed to protect those who would pay but
cannot, not those who can pay but will not").
The effect of the statute is to terminate the purchaser's interest, but only after he has
been given an opportunity to cure default. See MmN. STAT. § 559.21 (1976). The length
of time granted the purchaser depends upon the amount he has paid under the contract
prior to default. See id.
For a discussion of the merits of the statute, see Note, Cancellation of Contracts for
Deed: The Constitutionalityof the Minnesota Statutory Procedure, 58 MN. L. Rzy. 247
(1973); Note, Minnesota Land Contract in Action, 39 MmN. L. Rav. 93 (1954).
15. MwN. STAT. §§ 508.01-.84 (1976 & Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 16, 1978,
ch. 499, § 3, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 94 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 16, 1978,
ch. 500, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 95 (West), sets forth the procedure to be followed
when land is to be registered. For a discussion of the Torrens Act and the effect of
registration of titles, see Note, Konantz, Koester, McCrossan and Title to Torrens
Property,4 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 59 (1978).
16. See Minn. at -,
247 N.W.2d at 408 (quoting referee's conclusion number
three).
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assert an active interest in the property." The court noted that defendants could have asserted an active interest merely by tendering payment in their answer to the petition to register title or at any time during
the proceedings." Had the defendants tendered payment, the issue of
abandonment would have been rendered moot because, as the Berman
court remarked, "[m]ere failure to pay the purchase price or a short
delay in payment or break in communication among the parties does
not, absent other circumstances, justify a finding of abandonment.""
When the action to register title was commenced, the defendants had
been in default for about five months.10 In other cases, the court has held
that periods of delay for eleven weeks"1 or four months" would not justify
termination of the purchaser's interest on the ground that they had
abandoned it. However, when the period of delay has been more substantial, for example eighteen months, 3 the court will be more willing
to conclude that the interest has been abandoned. Thus, if the defendants in Berman had tendered payment in their answer to the vendor's
petition to register title, their rights in the property would have been
protected and a finding of abandonment unwarranted. Failure to tender
payment was a significant factor in Berman because of the defendants'
desertion of the property.
The purchaser's possession of the property is perhaps the most effective method of asserting an interest which would preclude a finding of
abandonment. However, failing to be in possession is not conclusive
evidence of abandonment if the purchaser has been involuntarily
evicted. In Tarpy v. Nowicki,24 for example, the court held that a finding
of abandonment was not justified when the vendor had forced the purchaser's caretaker to vacate the apartment building which was being
sold under the contract for deed." Although the purchaser had been in
17. Id. at -'
247 N.W.2d at 409.
18. Id.
19. Id. at -,
247 N.W.2d at 408 (emphasis added); accord, Rognrud v. Zubert, 282
Minn. 430, 437, 165 N.W.2d 244, 249-50 (1969); Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82,
86, 105 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1960).
20. See - Minn. at , 247 N.W.2d at 409. By the time the case reached the
supreme court, payments were over two years in arrears, a fact which the court noted. Id.
21. See Rognrud v. Zubert, 282 Minn. 430, 437-38, 165 N.W.2d 244, 249-50 (1969).
22. See Melco Inv. Corp. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 85-86, 105 N.W.2d 907, 909-10 (1960).
23. See Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 134, 94 N.W.2d 273, 283
(1959).
24. 286 Minn. 257, 175 N.W.2d 443 (1970). The purchaser in Tarpy sued the vendor for
rescission of the contract and for damages. The vendor had attempted a statutory cancellation pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1976), but failed to give the purchaser the
requisite 90-day notice. As a result, the statutory termination was not valid. 286 Minn.
at 263, 175 N.W.2d at 448.
25. 286 Minn. at 264, 175 N.W.2d at 448. The vendor apparently believed that under
MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1976), he was entitled to possession of the property once he had
served the purchaser with notice of cancellation. See 284 Minn. at 259, 175 N.W.2d at 445-

46.
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default for a number of months, the court did not conclude that her
failure to retain possession was voluntary. On the other hand, departure
from the property due to adverse financial conditions can be considered
voluntary, as the decision in Stadelmann v. Boothroyd illustrates.
There, the court indicated that had the purchaser remained in possession until evicted pursuant to a judicial decree, a finding of abandonment could not have been made.Y
In Berman, the fact that the vendor had secured a tenant for the
property apparently did not constitute an eviction of the vendee within
the meaning of the rule set forth in Tarpy. Although the defendants in
Berman were effectively precluded from taking possession of the property once the vendor's tenant began occupancy, the vendor in Berman
did not oust the defendants or their tenant from possession. He obtained
his own tenant after having found the property deserted. Thus, unlike
in Tarpy, the purchaser's departure in Berman was voluntary, and the
reasoning which was applied in Tarpy was inappropriate in Berman.
Other than by taking possession of the property, a purchaser may
assert an interest by paying the real estate taxes"8 or by commencing an
action for a judicial declaration of rights." In Buresh v. Allen,30 the
purchaser could not have abandoned his interest in the contract for deed
when he brought a suit for specific performance within five months of
the execution of the contract." However, in the early case of McDermid
26. 170 Minn. 430, 212 N.W. 908 (1927).
27. See id. at 433, 212 N.W. at 909.
28. The Berman court listed "failure to pay real estate taxes" as one of four factors
which it considered in arriving at the conclusion that the defendants had abandoned their
interest under the contract for deed. See Minn. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 408. However,
the weight attributed to nonpayment of real estate taxes depends upon the facts of the
case. See, e.g., Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286 Minn. 257, 259, 175 N.W.2d 443, 445 (1970) (purchaser's failure to pay taxes would not justify finding of abandonment when vendor unlawfully evicted purchaser's caretaker from possession of property).
29. See Buresh v. Allen, 296 Minn. 150, 153, 207 N.W.2d 279, 281 (1973) (per curiam)
(purchaser brought suit for specific performance); Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286 Minn. 257, 175
N.W.2d 443 (1970) (purchaser brought suit for rescission); Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259
Minn. 82, 85-86, 105 N.W.2d 907, 909-10 (1960) (purchaser brought suit for specific performance). But see note 33 infra and accompanying text.
No case has arisen in Minnesota in which a purchaser has sought a judicial determination of interests in a contract for deed pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
MINN. STAT. §§ 555.01-.16 (1976). The Act has been the basis of actions in which the terms
of a lease of real property, see Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Narverud Motor Co.,
238 Minn. 84, 55 N.W.2d 626 (1952), and a deed, see Ketterer v. Independent School Dist.
No. 1, 248 Minn. 212, 79 N.W.2d 428 (1956), have been in issue. It would therefore be
possible for the Act to form the basis of an action to determine the interests under a
contract for deed.
30. 296 Minn. 150, 207 N.W.2d 279 (1973) (per curiam). The purchaser in Buresh had
also taken steps to arrange financing, to have the land surveyed, and to close the transaction before commencing his suit for specific performance.
31. Id. at 153, 207 N.W.2d at 281; cf. Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286 Minn. 257, 262-63, 175
N.W.2d 443, 448 (1970) (purchaser's action for rescission not barred by delay).
theHamline
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commencing a lawsuit to seek a declaration of his rights
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v. McGregor," the court held that the purchaser's suit for specific performance was barred by abandonment as well as laches because he
failed to take action for approximately one year.33 In Berman, the purchaser's act of defending in the vendor's action to register title was not
a sufficient assertion of a property interest to negate a finding of abandonment."
Berman v. Kieren, while not a unique or unusual decision, thus illustrates the doctrine of abandonment as applied to the relinquishment of
a purchaser's interest in a contract for deed. Neither a mode of transferring title 5 nor a doctrine denying relief due to a failure to assert an
interest for a lengthy period of time,"' the doctrine of abandonment is,
as Chief Justice Gilfillan wrote over eighty years ago, "a means by which
rights or titles may be lost or extinguished. . . . ,,3" Dependent upon the
intention of the parties,"5 the doctrine exists not to deprive a person of
property rights,3 but to clear title to land in situations which could
otherwise leave the title in doubt.
may be sufficient to foreclose an inquiry into whether he has abandoned his interest under
the contract for deed, it does not foreclose the vendor from asserting any other defense he
may have against the purchaser. See, e.g., Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn.
123, 133-36, 94 N.W.2d 273, 282-83 (1959) (although purchaser's assignee proceeded diligently to protect his interests by bringing suit for specific performance, specific performance was not granted because he had failed to meet his obligations under the contract for
deed).
32. 21 Minn. 111 (1874).
33. Id. at 115. See also Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn. 398, 402, 173 N.W.2d 330,
333 (1969) (purchaser's suit for specific performance unfounded because, as trial court was
justified in concluding, it was probable that suit would not have been commenced had
vendor conveyed abandoned property to purchaser's uncle instead of to unrelated third
party); Stadelmann v. Boothroyd, 170 Minn. 430, 212 N.W. 908 (1927) (purchaser's action
for rescission could not be maintained when he was in default under contract for deed and
had previously abandoned interest in land by vacating premises).
34.
- Minn. at , 247 N.W.2d at 409 (by implication).
35. See, e.g., Vought v. Porter, 128 Minn. 43, 46, 209 N.W. 642, 642-43 (1926) (property
cannot be abandoned in favor of any person); Smith v. Glover, 50 Minn. 58, 74, 52 N.W.
912, 912 (1892) (same).
36. See, e.g., Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 86, 105 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1960)
(abandonment requires intent to relinquish rights; laches merely refers to lengthy delay
in asserting rights); Smith v. Glover, 50 Minn. 58, 74, 52 N.W. 912, 912 (1892) (lapse of
time controlling consideration in applying laches; in abandonment, lapse of time may be
important, but it is not essential).
37. Smith v. Glover, 50 Minn. 58, 74, 52 N.W. 912, 912 (1892).
38. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
39. If the court finds that a purchaser has abandoned his interest in the property, it is
merely an acknowledgment by the court of his relinquishment of rights. See, e.g., Mathwig
v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 350, 157 N.W. 589, 590 (1916). Thus, although one may lose a
title to real property through the application of the doctrine of abandonment, it cannot
be said that one is being deprived of his rights when he has intentionally departed with
them.
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